Xi Jinping's forceful diplomacy: China’s Cross-Border Villages in Bhutan

For five years, this development went unnoticed by foreign governments and outside observers.

By the time it was discovered, China had already built two additional villages within Bhutan’s recognized borders.

These villages were located in remote Himalayan regions.

As of now, China has established 22 such villages and settlements within Bhutan.

Satellite imagery shows that these settlements include around 752 residential blocks, divided into approximately 2,284 housing units.

To populate these villages, China has relocated or plans to relocate around 7,000 people, along with government officials, border police, and military personnel.

The construction of these settlements has resulted in the annexation of about 825 square kilometers of land from Bhutan, which accounts for just over 2 percent of the country's total territory.

Furthermore, China has cleared additional sites for more construction, expanded existing villages, and announced plans to upgrade three of the current villages into towns.

This development is documented in a report that highlights the locations, size, and strategic purpose of these villages.

It also discusses the long-standing border negotiations between China and Bhutan, which have spanned over 40 years, and China’s increasing reliance on assertive tactics with its smaller neighbor.

China has built these cross-border villages in two primary regions.

The first area is in western Bhutan, where eight villages have been established.

According to historian Tsering Shakya, this region was ceded to Bhutan by the 13th Dalai Lama of Tibet in 1913.

China’s interest in this area, particularly the 89-square-kilometer Doklam plateau, is strategic.

Control over Doklam would provide China a significant advantage in its ongoing border tensions with India.

China’s broader aim includes securing an agreement from Bhutan to host a Chinese embassy in Thimphu, Bhutan's capital.

The remaining 14 Chinese villages are located in northeastern Bhutan, specifically in regions known as Beyul Khenpajong, Menchuma, and the Pagsamlung and Jakarlung valleys.

China only began claiming these areas in the 1980s, though earlier official maps marked them as part of Bhutan.

These northeastern regions lack significant military or strategic value for China.

Instead, China aims to exchange these areas for land it desires in western Bhutan, including Doklam.

This intent was made clear in China’s "package deal" offer in 1990, where it proposed to return the northeastern territories in exchange for control of western Bhutanese regions.

However, Bhutan cannot easily agree to this exchange without India's consent, as Indo-Bhutanese treaties require Bhutan to consider India’s security concerns.

As a result, Bhutan has delayed agreeing to China’s proposed deal since the mid-1990s.

China's response to Bhutan’s hesitancy has followed a six-stage strategy.

First, in the early 1990s, China sent herders into disputed areas, displacing Bhutanese pastoralists.

Then, Tibetan herders built shelters, followed by military patrols to support their presence.

China later established military outposts, which were upgraded over time.

By 2016, China had begun constructing villages in these disputed areas.

In March 2023, Bhutan indicated it was close to finalizing a territorial exchange with China, appearing to have little choice but to accept many of China's terms.

Despite this, China has not halted construction. Instead, since early 2023, it has accelerated development, building seven additional villages in northeastern Bhutan, significantly increasing the housing stock in that region.

The report concludes that China is now unlikely to return to Bhutan any of the areas where it has constructed villages, which accounts for about 80 percent of the disputed land.

Given that Bhutan is unlikely to hand over the Doklam region due to India’s concerns, China may argue it is not obligated to return these annexed areas.

Instead, if Bhutan agrees to cede non-Doklam areas in its western border to China, China is expected to relinquish only claims to unoccupied territories while returning a small section of land, roughly 147 square kilometers, where it has not built villages or relocated settlers.